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The Evolution of National and Religious Identity in Contemporary Ireland

On 12 July 1998, the Tour de France came to Ireland. The first stage of the competition was held in and around Dublin, where thousands of spectators lined the streets to catch a glimpse of the cyclists as they raced towards the finish in Phoenix Park. The city had not seen such a major public event since the visit of Pope John Paul II in the autumn of 1979. Yet in the intervening two decades, the Republic of Ireland was transformed, and the nature of this transformation may be glimpsed in the contrast between these two events and their symbolic significance. The Republic that greeted the Pontiff with such adulation in 1979 remained, at least on the surface, the pious, impoverished and long-suffering country it had always been, afflicted by high unemployment and haunted by the apparently intractable sectarian conflict north of the border. By 1998, however, there was a tangible sense that Ireland was now on the cutting edge of the new Europe: energetic, prosperous, increasingly tolerant, and thanks to the recent Good Friday Agreement, actively promoting a framework for lasting peace in Ulster. Metaphorically speaking, then, life in the Republic had gone from standing under leaden skies during an open-air papal mass to cheering colourful athletes speeding through the sunny streets of Dublin.

Of course, such a contrast of moments serves to highlight the profound shift that has taken place in Irish society, but it does little to illuminate the underlying realities of the moments themselves or the complex and sometimes contradictory forces that have led the country from one point to the other. To begin with, many of the social, political and economic trends associated with the renaissance of the nineties were already underway by 1979. By the same token, many of the traditional identity-markers of Irishness presumed to have disappeared during the past decade have retained a salience for some people right up to the present day. However tempting it might be to conclude, therefore, that the Republic's experience represents a straightforward case of secularization – a wholesale exchange of agrarian Catholic nationalism for high-tech European cosmopolitanism – life on the ground is not in fact so simple. It would be far more accurate to recognize that while the Catholic nationalist monoculture defining Ireland during most of the twentieth century has eroded dramatically in recent years, neither religion nor nationality has perforce ceased to matter. Rather, an unprecedented material prosperity, in conjunction with the diminishment of the Catholic Church's moral authority and the state's embrace of European integration, have awakened in the Irish a new sense of possibility and of choice. No longer constrained by the former orthodoxies, the country is asserting itself and its values in ways unthinkable a generation ago. To be 'secular' in this context may or may not mean ceasing to be religious, but it does mean recognizing the legitimacy of being something other than Catholic in the old, highly prescribed way. Likewise, to be 'European' may or may not mean repudiating nationalist commitments, but it does mean recognizing the viability of being Irish without constant recourse to anti-Englishness. The speed with which Ireland has undergone this process of social liberalization has indeed been dizzying, and clearly there are those who have been disorientated and estranged by it. But for a far greater number, especially among the young, the essence of being Irish increasingly lies in the very capacity to assimilate and abide in the multiple and overlapping identities of late modernity. As uncertain as this condition must surely be for them as individuals, never have the Irish as a people displayed more confidence in the promise and variety of their own becoming.

The roots of this transformation may be traced back nearly half a century. In 1958-9, two major changes took place that would have far-reaching effects upon Irish society in the years to come. The first was the election of Pope John XXIII in October 1958, which heralded a programme of reforms in the Catholic Church under the auspices of the Second Vatican Council. The impact of these reforms upon a body as profoundly conservative as the Irish Catholic Church remains difficult to overstate.¹ The second major development was the replacement of Eamon de Valera by Seán Lemass as Taoiseach [Prime Minister] in June 1959. Lemass's leadership was to become the catalyst for a whole series of initiatives to bolster the Irish economy and rejuvenate national life.² Both as economic and foreign policy, the decision to abandon its defensive posture towards Britain and embrace regional free trade led to steady export-driven growth for Ireland throughout the sixties, culminating in its admission to the EEC in 1973.³ Meanwhile, a variety of social changes were taking place in the Republic, not least an ongoing process of urbanization.⁴ A native television service was introduced in 1961 and increasingly served as a forum for national debate and international awareness, while the much-hated literary censorship was effectively dismantled in 1967.⁵ Later the same decade the contraceptive pill became available, heralding the advent of the sexual revolution and the gathering force of feminist concerns. Correspondingly, the open conflict between Irish liberals and conservatives over the 1968 papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae* revealed fissures within a Catholic population previously assumed to be unified on such matters.⁶ And the explosion of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 in turn provoked a re-evaluation of church-state relations in the Republic, prompting the successful 1972 referendum to remove the clause from the Irish Constitution according a 'special position' to the Catholic Church.⁷

While all these novelties anticipated the still more fundamental changes yet to come, much about the Ireland of the seventies and eighties remained familiar. Despite economic modernization, high unemployment continued to afflict the populace, as did high rates of immigration. And notwithstanding the increased co-operation between the two countries, the Troubles in Ulster continued to highlight for many Irish people their ancient and visceral quarrel with Protestant Britain. Moreover, when the Pope visited the island in 1979, more than 90% of Catholics still claimed to attend Mass at least once a week.⁸ At the same time, though, the fault-line within the Republic on social matters grew wider, as evidenced by the controversial abortion referendum of 1983. Though anti-abortion advocates ultimately prevailed in the debate, the campaign leading up to the vote demonstrated the growing assertiveness of liberal values and, in particular, of Irish feminism.⁹ The unexpected election of Labour candidate Mary Robinson to the Presidency in 1990 confirmed this trend, and her tenure soon epitomized the newfound hope and burgeoning prosperity Ireland started to experience at century's end.¹⁰ Robinson's eloquent espousals of Irish self-belief proved a timely counterpoint to the revelations of financial corruption in government and sexual scandal in the Catholic Church that proliferated during the nineties. She and her successor, Mary McAleese, worked to encourage a civil society less dependent upon the traditional authority of the priests and politicians with whom there was now widespread disillusionment.¹¹ The abolition in 1993 of the law forbidding homosexual relations between men, along with the legalization of divorce in 1995, both suggested a growing willingness by many Irish people to tolerate, if not necessarily approve, alternative social values.¹² Yet the exceptionally close vote in the divorce referendum along the lines of conservative-rural versus liberal-urban bespoke the larger polarization underway not only in terms of geography, but class and age as well. Due to the longstanding trend of urbanization, in combination with the influx of educated young people no longer forced to immigrate, almost one-third of the population lived in greater Dublin at the dawn of new millennium. And the modern Ireland they were shaping and being shaped by had less and less in common with a more traditional Ireland still operating on the fringes.¹³

Ireland's transformation during the nineties made it the darling of Europeanization. Though a significant proportion of the Republic's economic growth was in fact due to Anglo-American corporate investment, it nonetheless became popular to attribute such success to the Republic's wholehearted embrace of the European unification project.²⁶ This view gained added resonance in 1996 when, for the first time, it was announced that the Irish now produced more wealth per capita than did the unity-shy British. Whatever the underlying facts, Ireland now found itself doing better than its more powerful neighbour, and the reason appeared to be Europe. As this perception began to percolate into the popular consciousness, a fundamental shift took place in the national psyche: for the first time, it was not only possible but necessary to conceive of Ireland as something more than simply the antithesis of Britain.²⁷ Not surprisingly, diehard Irish Catholic nationalists have resisted claims that the ancient quarrel is past, as have those liberal intellectuals for whom post-colonial theoretical categories retain their Manichean allure.²⁸ It has even been suggested that far from serving as a liberating manoeuvre by which Ireland might overcome the crippling effects of an outdated preoccupation, Europeanization has merely been a way for the country to deny its colonial history and transfer its unresolved inferiority complex to another arena.²⁹ But such analysis would appear blind to the fact that, whatever abstract feelings of resentment the Irish may retain towards England about the past, in practice they see contemporary Britons as the people most like themselves.³⁰ Likewise, the state's political embrace of Europe has not proved so much a slavish lurch from one ideological master to another as a self-conscious attempt to complicate Ireland's regional position. Or, as Northern politician John Hume once put it, the shift should be seen not as a betrayal of Irish nationalism but rather an attempt 'to enjoy properly the inchoate European outlook and vision which was lost in our oppressive and obsessive relationship with Britain.'³¹ Current Taoiseach Bertie Ahern reiterated the point in 2001 when he referred to Ireland's Europeanization as the best means by which to 'develop a new and more balanced relationship with Britain' by contextualizing it among relationships with others.³²

Yet despite their remarkable success in using European integration as a platform for economic development and as a counterpoint to nationalist orthodoxy, it is unclear what specific cultural meaning Europe now has for the Irish. Of course, in this respect they are hardly unique among the Union's member states. What is noteworthy, however, is the frequency with which certain advocates of integration have invoked a notion of shared European Christian values and traditions as an ideological basis for Irish participation. In practice such arguments have never been as decisive as the promise of increased prosperity for the country, but nonetheless they have retained a consistent if vague appeal.³³ Belief in the possibility of a pan-European cultural identity is predicated upon the conviction that such a unified entity existed in pre-Reformation, pre-national Europe and is now simply waiting to be recovered and restored.³⁴ Anticipating that this process of recovery was the next step in the Europeanization project, one Irish commentator predicted in 2003 that 'after decades of torpidity, cultural Europe may just be about to experience its big bang'.³⁵ This expectation has proven premature, and at least so far, Anthony D. Smith's assessment of Europe as 'merely an arena, a field force, for conflicting identities and cultures' remains an accurate assessment of the reality.³⁶

Even so, Irish voices from across the Republic's political and religious spectrum have expressed a belief that the European Union should develop a coherent moral vision to match its success as a free-trade area.³⁷ Whether the population at large shares this commitment is another matter. Although the Irish public's attitude toward integration is currently one of the most supportive in the EU, it is not clear that such enthusiasm will be sustained by idealism if and when the economic benefits become less compelling.³⁸

A strong counterpoint to European idealism – or indeed idealism of any kind – in the contemporary Republic has been the belated but forceful arrival of mass consumerism. After generations of material want and communal self-denial, Irish people are now assiduously pursuing a culture of material gratification and individual self-indulgence.⁶ An unprecedented atmosphere of personal choice now prevails, buoyed by the ready availability of credit and the rapid introduction of progressive social legislation.⁷ Yet the single-mindedness with which the Irish have begun to pursue their newfound freedom and affluence has led some to worry that certain good qualities from the old Ireland have been lost in the process. Writing in 2002, the poet Seamus Heaney worried that ‘some kind of metaphysic has disappeared from the common life... I think we are running on an unconscious that is informed by religious values, but I think my youngsters’ youngsters won’t have that.’⁸ Though a causal relationship between the new prosperity and the decline in religious observance cannot be straightforwardly postulated, it is nonetheless clear that the Catholic Church’s loss of public influence both reflects and has contributed to a widespread diminishment in social solidarity. Shamed throughout the 1990s by revelations of sexual misconduct among its clergy, abuse within the welfare institutions of its religious orders, and subsequent attempts by its hierarchy to cover up the evidence, the Church has since been decidedly more modest and conciliatory in its public pronouncements.⁹ While many Catholic clergy still see the Church as having a key role to play in promoting spiritual values in Irish life, there is a growing recognition that the institution must work to meet people where they are. When interviewed recently about his work among young people in Dublin, for example, the Revd. Brendan McManus acknowledged that ‘we’re trying to bring the message in a different way, through music, through creative, dynamic liturgy, and through participation’, adding: ‘Many people realize that there is a void there, even with all the affluence and the consumer culture.’¹⁰

Part of the challenge the Catholic Church now faces, though, is that increasingly people in the Republic do not regard religious observance as intrinsic to their Irish identity but as just another ‘lifestyle choice’ that this same consumer culture affords them.¹¹ Or, as Sheridan Gilley has aptly put it, the Irish middle class ‘no longer buys it religion wholesale’.¹² So while it is true that the rate of weekly church attendance among Catholics in Ireland remains among the highest in Europe – only in Malta and Poland do people attend Mass more regularly – such a statistic needs to be read contextually.¹³ Recalling that 90% of Irish Catholics attended Mass regularly in the 1980s, it is striking that in a 2003 survey, only 44% claimed to do the same, while the figure for young people in Dublin was down to 30%.¹⁴ On the other hand, there is also a case to be made for not relying upon regular Mass attendance as the only criterion for assessing spiritual conviction. Irish Catholics increasingly evince a willingness to differentiate between Christianity’s ‘core teachings’ and the Church’s teachings about sex and authority, such that belief and practice are no longer correlative.¹⁵ And nowhere is this growing confidence in their own judgment on matters of faith and morals more plainly demonstrated than in the virtual extinction of sacramental confession, once a staple of Irish Catholic practice.¹⁶ Indeed, there is a sense that, save among the ageing rural population, Irish people are now going out of their way to assert their freedom from, if not total indifference to, their religious inheritance. This was particularly evident in their response to the death of John Paul II in April 2005. In marked contrast to the rapturous and universal welcome the Pontiff received when he visited Ireland in 1979, media coverage of his passing was studiously dispassionate.¹⁷ And while 10,000 attended a vigil at the Marian shrine of Knock in rural Co. Mayo on the day of the funeral, life in Dublin was notable for its ordinariness.¹⁸ Perhaps most telling of all was the uncertainty in the Government as to whether it should proclaim an official day of mourning. That the perennially popular Bertie Ahern initially assumed such observance was unnecessary and, when challenged about this, conceded only that it should be optional, demonstrates just how far Irish Catholic piety has moved from public norm to personal choice.¹⁹

The mixed response by Irish Catholics to the election of Joseph Ratzinger as John Paul's successor was similarly noteworthy, but it was the well-publicised critique of the new Pope by Protestant layman David Norris that bespoke another key shift in Irish social discourse.²⁶ Since the early 1970s, the Protestant minority in the Republic has gained steadily in collective confidence, having been largely silent during the fifty years following Irish Independence in 1922.²⁷ Those few Protestants who during this earlier period dared to speak out against the pervasive Catholic nationalist orthodoxy encountered a level of obloquy now difficult to credit.²⁸ Especially during the last decade, though, Protestant church leaders, intellectuals and politicians have become increasingly vocal in their opinions about the moral and social condition of the country.²⁹ Far from provoking the sort of Catholic reaction his remarks would have elicited a generation ago, David Norris' attack on Benedict XVI appears to have been accepted as simply another opinion among many about the prospects of the new pontificate. In this respect, the loosening grip of Catholic nationalism upon Irish sensibilities has obviously benefited the Protestant minority. The Church of Ireland's comparatively progressive social teachings have also given it an institutional credibility among younger Catholics that they are rarely prepared to extend to the Church of their birth. Yet at the same time, this unprecedented level of acceptance into the mainstream of Irish society is forcing Southern Protestants to re-evaluate their communal identity as something other than simple resistance to monolithic Catholicism.³⁰ Writing in the *Irish Times* in August 2005, for example, Michael Webb upbraided his co-religionist Robin Bury for claiming that the Republic remained a 'cold place' for Protestants: 'Any Irish woman or man, Protestant or not, who is prepared to contribute will find modern Ireland a warm place', he insisted. Rather than rake over the past, Webb added, Protestants should instead lead the way in witnessing to just how 'cold' Ireland can often be for the impoverished, the uninsured, and the recently arrived.³¹

The fate of the many immigrants now coming to Ireland is not only a social justice issue for the Church of Ireland but also an increasingly important factor in its own development. For the first time in over a century, Church of Ireland membership in the South is growing, and this is due mainly to the influx of Anglican immigrants from African and Asian countries. And while this resurgence in numbers comes as a boon to a church whose continued viability in the Republic has often been the subject of grave concern, it brings with it the challenge of how to accommodate an unprecedented level of cultural heterogeneity within the community. Acknowledging as much in 2003, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, John Neill, called on Irish Anglicans 'to do more to welcome their co-religionists from overseas.'³² Both Neill and his Roman Catholic counterpart, Archbishop Diarmuid Martin, have affirmed their churches' commitment to the rights of immigrants, encouraging the Government to adopt an 'open, transparent, modern and enlightened national migration policy' and, more specifically, to regularize immigrants' legal status after five years.³³ The importance of immigrants not just to the future of the Church of Ireland but to the future of religion in Ireland generally cannot be underestimated. The most recent Irish Census revealed that between 1991 and 2002, the number of people claiming Catholicism rose, even though the number of Irish-born Catholics fell by 15,000 and the Church's membership dropped from 91.6% of the overall population to 88.4%.³⁴ The three main Protestant churches also saw notable increases, but these were slight compared with the massive jump in the number of Orthodox Christians, who went from 400 in 1991 to 10,400 in 2002, an increase of 2,815%. Similarly impressive in the category of Christian groups has been the proliferation of smaller, independent 'black majority' churches, estimated by the Irish Council of Churches to possess approximately 10,000 members combined. Just important, though, is the increase in the Republic of non-Christian communities. During the 1990s, the number of self-identifying Muslims rose from 3,900 to 19,100, a climb of 390%. The number of Buddhists and Hindus also increased significantly, while the decline in the Jewish community halted. Almost all these figures are easily attributable to the tremendous growth in immigration since the early nineties. Among the native-born Irish themselves, though, the trend has been towards non-affiliation: almost 139,000 people now identify themselves as having no religion, making them the second largest block of the population after Roman Catholics.³⁵

Is it enough, then, merely to conclude that the native-born Irish are becoming godless consumers, while immigrants are keeping religion alive in a nation whose founders never even imagined their presence? This, like any straightforward explanation, obviously cannot do justice to the complex society Ireland has become. It is true that life in the Republic is now more secular and cosmopolitan than it was twenty years ago, but such changes have been embraced by most Irish people more at the level of practicality than of principle. Manifestly, they have not replaced their old idealism with a new one. If Diarmaid Ferriter was right when recently he characterized the Irish as ‘a fat, drunken, indebted people who are also obsessed with healthcare’, it may be that such material excess is serving as a necessary corrective to past excesses of other kinds.¹⁶ Church and state are realigning themselves as public actors, and the challenges of a pluralistic future are beginning to replace those of the sectarian past.¹⁷ Or, as Ian d’Alton has succinctly put it, cultural debate and social policy in Ireland are more likely in the coming years to revolve around ‘the place of Poles rather than protestants’.¹⁸ In this sense, the human presence of European integration will remain long after the economic advantages of the EU cease to galvanize Irish enthusiasm for it. Likewise, religion as a daily presence in Irish life will continue to assert itself, even as traditional Catholicism gradually takes its place as but one personal option among many. The negotiation of religious and national identities will thus remain factors with which the new Irish will have to contend, even if the terms under which they do so will have altered beyond all recognition. And their capacity to greet such change pragmatically is now key to who and what they understand themselves as people to have become.

NOTES

¹ My thanks go to Roy Foster, Ian d’Alton, Philip Howell, Susan Hood, Alana Harris and William Whyte for their helpful comments and suggestions during the preparation of this article.

² Tom Garvin, 2001, *Redefining Southern Nationalism: An Academic Perspective*, Dublin: Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, p. 8; Andrew M. Greeley, 2003, *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Profile*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, p. 185-6.

³ Michael P. Hornsby-Smith, 1992, ‘Social and Religious Transformation in Ireland: A Case of Secularisation?’, in J.H. Goldthorpe and C.T. Whelan (eds.), *The Development of Industrial Society in Ireland*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 267, 285-7 [pp. 265-90].

⁴ Niamh Hardiman and Christopher Whelan, 1998, ‘Changing Values’, in Raymond Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds.), in *Ireland and the Politics of Change*, London: Longman, pp. 84-5 [pp. 66-85]; Mary Kenny, 2000, *Goodbye to Catholic Ireland*, rev. edn., Dublin: New Island, p. 284.

⁵ Marguerite Corish, 1996, ‘Aspects of the Secularisation of Irish Society 1958-1996’, in Eoin G. Cassidy (ed.), *Faith and Culture in the Irish Context*, Dublin: Veritas, pp. 140-1 [pp. 138-72].

⁶ Tom Garvin, 1998, ‘Patriots and republicans: an Irish evolution’, in Raymond Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds.), in *Ireland and the Politics of Change*, London: Longman, p. 154 [pp. 144-55].

⁷ Carmen Kuhling and Kieran Keohane, 2002, ‘Celebrity Case Studies in the Localisation of the Global’, in Mary P. Corcoran and Michel Peillon (eds.), *Ireland Unbound: A Turn of the Century Chronicle* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, p. 104 [pp. 103-118].

⁸ Dermot Keogh, 1994, *Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, pp. 261-3; J.J. Lee, 1989, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 655.

⁹ John Horgan, 1997, *Seán Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, pp. 348-57.

¹⁰ Ben Tonra, 2001, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, pp. 107-8, 117.

¹¹ Corish, ‘Aspects of the Secularisation’, p. 144.

¹² Michael Adams, 1968, *Censorship: the Irish Experience*, Dublin: Sceptre, pp. 120-8, 199.

¹³ Kenny, *Goodbye to Catholic Ireland*, pp. 216-22, 237.

¹⁴ J.H. Whyte, 1980, *Church and State in Modern Ireland, 1923-1979*, 2nd edn., Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, p. 389.

¹⁵ Sheridan Gilley, 2003, ‘Catholicism in Ireland’, in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 99 [pp. 99-112].

¹⁶ See Tom Hesketh, 1990, *The Second Partitioning of Ireland?: The Abortion Referendum of 1983*, Dun Laoghaire, Co. Dublin: Brandsma.

- ¹⁷ Michel Peillon, 2000, 'Carnival Ireland', in Eamonn Slater and Michel Peillon (eds.), *Memories of the Present: A Sociological Chronicle of Ireland, 1997-1998*, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, p. 140 [pp. 133-42].
- ¹⁸ Terence Brown, 2004, *Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922-2002*, rev. edn., London: Harper Perennial, pp. 380-1.
- ¹⁹ Kenny, *Goodbye to Catholic Ireland*, pp. 292-4; *Irish Times* 24 June 2005.
- ²⁰ Hardiman and Whelan, 'Changing Values', pp. 70-5.
- ²¹ David McWilliams, 2005, *The Pope's Children: Ireland's New Elite*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, p. 92
- ²² Fintan O'Toole, 1997, *The Ex-Isle of Erin: Images of a Global Ireland*, Dublin: New Island, pp. 12-13, 18-21.
- ²³ For a summation and critique of this position, see Stephen Howe, 2000, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 122; and Liam Kennedy, 1996, *Colonialism, Religion and Nationalism in Ireland*, Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, p. 219.
- ²⁴ Brian Fallon, 1998, *An Age of Innocence: Irish Culture 1930-1960*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, p. 3; Terence McDonough, 2005, 'Introduction', in Terence McDonough (ed.), *Was Ireland a Colony?: Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, viii [vii-xiv]; *Irish Times*, 9 Jan. 2006.
- ²⁵ *Irish Times* 23 Mar. 2005.
- ²⁶ John Hume, 1988, 'Europe of the Regions', in Richard Kearney (ed.), *Across the Frontiers: Ireland in the 1990s*, Dublin: Wolfhound, p. 56 [pp. 45-57].
- ²⁷ Bertie Ahern, 'Europe: The Irish Viewpoint', speech delivered to 'Wales, Europe and the World' Forum, Newport, 1 Mar. 2001 [www.taoiseach.gov.ie].
- ²⁸ Karin Gilland, 2001, 'Ireland and European Integration', in Kjell Goldmann and Karin Gilland (eds.), *Nationality versus Europeanisation: The National View of the Nation in Four EU Countries*, Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, p. 22 [pp. 21-49].
- ²⁹ Anthony D. Smith, 1995, *Nations and Nationalisms in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, p. 129.
- ³⁰ *Irish Times* 29 Dec. 2003.
- ³¹ Smith, *Nations and Nationalisms*, p. 131.
- ³² Eg. Labour politician Justin Keating's article in the *Irish Times* 5 Nov. 2004; Garret Fitzgerald, 1994, 'Ireland, Britain, Europe: Beyond Economic and Political Unity', in James P. Mackey (ed.), *The Cultures of Europe: The Irish Contribution*, Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, p. 185 [pp. 184-96]; Anthony Cronin, 2002, 'Address', in *National Forum on Europe: Report of Proceedings*, n.14, Dublin: Government Stationery Office, p. 64 [pp. 63-82]; Kenneth Milne, 2002, 'Church of Ireland submission to the National Forum on Europe', speech delivered at Dublin Castle, 1 Feb. 2002. [www.ireland.anglican.org]; Tony Brown, 2002, *Why Europe?*, Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, p. 28.
- ³³ *Irish Times* 18 Feb. 2005.
- ³⁴ Tom Inglis, 2002, 'Pleasure Pursuits', in Mary P. Corcoran and Michel Peillon (eds.), *Ireland Unbound: A Turn of the Century Chronicle*, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, p. 35 [pp. 25-35].
- ³⁵ Corish, 'Aspects of the Secularisation', p. 141; McWilliams, *The Pope's Children*, p. 116.
- ³⁶ David Martin, 2005, *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory*, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, qtd. 134.
- ³⁷ Kenny, *Goodbye to Catholic Ireland*, pp. 295-305; Brown, *Ireland*, p. 370.
- ³⁸ *Boston Globe* 2 May 2005.
- ³⁹ Anne Looney, 1996, 'Disappearing Echoes, New Voices and the Sound of Silence' in Seán MacRámoinn (ed.), *The Church in the New Ireland*, Dublin: Columba Press, pp. 28-9 [pp. 25-39].
- ⁴⁰ Sheridan Gilley, 'Catholicism in Ireland', p. 109.
- ⁴¹ *Irish Times* 24 June 2005.
- ⁴² *Irish Times* 30 Sept. 2003.
- ⁴³ Greeley, *Religion in Europe*, pp. 156-61; Tom Inglis, 1998, *Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland*, 2nd edn., Dublin: University College Dublin Press, pp. 241-2.
- ⁴⁴ Corish, 'Aspects of the Secularisation', p. 164.
- ⁴⁵ *Irish Times* 9 Apr. 2005.
- ⁴⁶ *Irish Times* 4 Apr. 2005.
- ⁴⁷ *Irish Times* 5 Apr. 2005.
- ⁴⁸ *Irish Times* 20 Apr. 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Whyte, *Church and State*, p. 385.
- ⁵⁰ I have explored this situation in detail in my doctoral thesis, 'The Minority Voice: Hubert Butler, Southern Protestantism and Intellectual Dissent in Ireland, 1930-72' (Faculty of Modern History, University of Oxford, 2004).
- ⁵¹ *Church of Ireland Gazette* 11 Dec. 1998; Alan Acheson, 2002, *A History of the Church of Ireland, 1691-2001*, rev. edn., Dublin: Columba Press/APCK, p. 274.
- ⁵² John Coakley, 1998, 'Religion, ethnic identity and the Protestant minority in the Republic', in Raymond Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds.), *Ireland and the Politics of Change*, London: Longman, pp. 104-5 [pp. 86-106].

⁵³ *Irish Times* 8 Aug. 2005.

⁵⁴ *Irish Times* 20 June 2003.

⁵⁵ *Irish Times* 6 Jan 2003.

⁵⁶ *Irish Times* 9 Feb. 2004.

⁵⁷ *Irish Times* 10 Feb. 2004, 10 Aug. 2004.

⁵⁸ *Irish Times* 17 Dec 2005.

⁵⁹ *Irish Times* 12 Oct. 2004

⁶⁰ Ian d'Alton, 2004, 'Remembering the future, imagining the past – the journeys of southern Irish protestantism' [revised version of a paper presented to the National Library of Ireland Society, Dublin, 26 Feb. 2004]. Used with permission from the author.